Bankable Power, Unbankable Politics
Power Purchase Agreements, Democratic Risk, and the Political Economy of Energy Finance in Ghana
Abstract
This paper contends that in Ghana, Power purchase agreements (PPAs) operate as quasi-constitutional governance documents that allocate political risk, shape tariff trajectories, and bind future governments in legitimacy eroding ways. I argue that because bankability is achieved by shifting currency, offtake, and demand risk from private capital to the public through tariffs, guarantees, and termination payments, PPAs have not only created debt level crises that constrain government, they have also created a mismatch between our generation capacity and transmission infrastructure. I draw on Grossman and Hart’s incomplete contract theory and, connecting it to Guasch et al’s model of concession renegotiation, show that the frequent renegotiations of PPAs across Latin America and Africa is a quintessential and inherent part of the nature of project finance itself. Renegotiations of PPAs should thus be considered and expressly provided for in PPAs. Ghana ought to rethink her mechanisms for developing her electricity infrastructure.